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Abstract Assessments of the benefits of climate change mitigation—and thus of the
appropriate stringency of greenhouse gas emissions abatement—depend upon ethi-
cal, legal, and political economic considerations. Global climate change mitigation is
often represented as a repeated prisoners’ dilemma in which the net benefits of sus-
tained global cooperation exceed the net benefits of uncooperative unilateral action
for any given actor. Global cooperation can be motivated either by circumspection—
a decision to account for the damages one’s own actions inflict upon others—or
by the expectation of reciprocity from others. If the marginal global benefits of
abatement are approximately constant in total abatement, the domestically optimal
price approaches the global cooperative optimum linearly with increasing circum-
spection and reciprocity. Approximately constant marginal benefits are expected if
climate damages are quadratic in temperature and if the airborne fraction of carbon
emissions is constant. If, on the other hand, damages increase with temperature
faster than quadratically or carbon sinks weaken significantly with increasing CO2
concentrations, marginal benefits will decline with abatement. In this case, the
approach to the global optimum is concave and less than full circumspection and/or
reciprocity can lead to optimal domestic abatement close to the global optimum.
This work does not reflect the official views or policies of the United States
government or any agency thereof, including the Department of Energy.
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1 Introduction
Regardless of whether it is implemented in the form of an explicit carbon price
or more targeted policies and measures, climate change mitigation policy involves
trade offs. On one side are the uncertain costs of transforming the energy system;
on the other, the still more uncertain and “fat-tailed” costs of climate change itself.
By explicitly balancing these tradeoffs, quantitative benefit-cost analysis (BCA)
can inform decisions about the appropriate stringency of mitigation policies, but
its application requires an estimate of the economic benefits of abating emissions.
The social cost of carbon (SCC) provides a measure of these benefits. It is an
estimate of the change in expected welfare of a representative agent resulting from
a marginal emission of CO2, normalized by the change in expected welfare resulting
from a marginal decrease in consumption. In other words, it expresses the amount
a representative agent should be willing to spend to obtain a marginal reduction in
CO2 emissions.
Estimates of the SCC are currently used by the U.S. government as part of BCA
of proposed regulations with impacts on greenhouse gas emissions (Interagency
Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon 2010, 2013). A number of core as-
sumptions underlie these analyses; these include scenarios of future economic growth
and emissions, the near-term and long-term response of the climate to greenhouse
gas forcing, the economic damages incurred as a result of different amounts of
climate change, the discount factors used to weight different time periods and states
of the world, and the equity weights used to value regions with different levels of
consumption (Kopp and Mignone 2012; Anthoff and Tol 2010). Here, we focus on
two related decisions regarding scenario selection and the inclusion of economic
damages abroad. First, the existing U.S. SCC estimates utilize emissions scenarios
that predominantly represent business-as-usual (BAU) pathways, with no major
global mitigation actions, as opposed to benefit-cost optimal pathways. Second, the
U.S. SCC damage estimates incorporate the costs of climate change not just to the
United States but to the world as a whole. In other words, the U.S. estimates are
measures of the global SCC rather than the domestic SCC.
Masur and Posner (2011) note that the choice of a global SCC raises normative
and institutional questions. In particular: do citizens of one country have the same
obligations toward foreigners as toward their fellow citizens, or should damages to
foreigners be weighted less than domestic damages? And how are other nations’
abatement actions likely to depend upon one’s own choices or choices by third
parties? This latter question links the two sets of earlier decisions together; if greater
abatement by one country leads to increased abatement by others, a higher domestic
carbon price will deflect global emissions more significantly away from BAU, thus
informing the selection of an appropriate scenario.
Estimates of the SCC that exceed the domestic SCC can be motivated on one
of two grounds: an ethical/legal principle we call circumspection or a political
economic principle we call reciprocity. Masur and Posner’s first question relates to
circumspection, and their second to reciprocity.
Circumspection (from the Latin circumspecere, “to look around”) refers to the
inclusion of extraterritorial damages caused by one’s own actions. Circumspection
might be motivated by acceptance of the “polluter pays” norm, or by the expectation
of tort liability under that principle (Sachs 2008). This norm is well-established
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in international law. For example, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration declares that
“States have ... the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States” (United Nations
1972). In the United States, consideration of extraterritorial damage caused by
federal action has been mandated for more than three decades under National
Environmental Protection Act guidance (Carter 1979; Council on Environmental
Quality 1997), and four decades of legal precedents have recognized the standing of
foreign intervenors to challenge Environmental Impact Statements (e.g., Wilderness
Society v. Morton 1973; Swinomish Tribal Community v. FERC 1980). In addition,
if potential “spillover” of climate change damages between regions (for example,
due to economic or national security interactions) is not explicitly incorporated into
domestic damage estimates, circumspection might be used as a way to account for
these effects (Kopp and Mignone 2012; Warren 2011).
Reciprocity refers to additional mitigation from other nations in response to
domestic mitigation. It can be a self-interested response to mitigation by others
under some payoff structures, such as a repeated prisoners’ dilemma (Barrett 2002).
Assumptions about reciprocity may be implicit or explicit in policy formulation. An
example of implicit reciprocity is the 2009 North American Leaders’ Declaration
on Climate Change, in which heads of state committed themselves to setting and
implementing “ambitious mid-term and long-term goals to reduce national and
North American emissions” in the hopes of “strengthen[ing] the political momentum
behind a successful outcome at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC”
(North American Leaders 2009). An example of explicit reciprocity is the European
Union’s Copenhagen Accord pledge to reduce its emissions by 20 % below 1990
levels by 2020, or to reduce its emissions by 30 % below 1990 levels “provided that
other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emissions reductions
and that developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibili-
ties and respective capabilities” (Council of the European Union and the European
Commission 2010). Whereas circumspection is similarly relevant for all countries
(Landis and Bernauer 2012), reciprocity is more relevant for major powers, since
their abatement decisions are likely to inspire more reciprocal action by others.
In this paper, we first develop formal definitions of circumspection and reciprocity
and, using a simple analytical framework, derive the domestically optimal carbon
price in terms of these parameters. We then numerically examine the relationship
between circumspection, reciprocity and optimal carbon prices. In addition, we show
how this relationship is affected by assumptions about the shape of the climate
change damage function and about the response of the carbon cycle to increasing
CO2 concentrations. We conclude with a brief discussion of policy implications.
2 Modeling approach
2.1 Analytical framework
Consider a game with n players. Each player i produces a certain amount of a public
good (abatement of greenhouse gas emissions), denoted by Ai, and subsequently
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The net present value to player i of a certain set of abatement choices A is
given by







⎠ + Xi(A) (1)
where Zi are abatement costs, Bi are the discounted abatement benefits that depend
only on total global abatement, and Xi are discounted benefits that depend on the




i are the relevant marginal quantities.
Denote the conjectural variations ∂ A j
∂ Ai
= αi, j, and denote ∑ j=i αi, j = αi. “Reci-
procity,” formally defined below, will be a linear scaling of the conjectural variations.
The total derivative of player i’s change in net present value with respect to its own
abatement is given by
dUi(A)
dAi













so at player i’s optimal abatement level A∗i
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The left-hand side here is the marginal abatement cost; the right-hand side is the
marginal benefit of abatement and, equivalently in this framework, the social cost of
carbon.













where li, j equals the degree of circumspection adopted by player i toward player j.
Most typically, li, j ∈ [0, 1], though considerations such as equity weighting could lead
to li, j > 1. Since the benefits of circumspection for player i refer to the reduced impact
on other players caused by its own abatement (and only by its own abatement), let
the other partial derivatives of Xi be zero. Then Eq. 3 can be written as
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Henceforth, we define a marginal benefit function such that marginal benefits to
each player are proportional to global marginal benefits, with bi being player i’s share
of global marginal benefits; in particular, B′i(
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j A j) = biφ(
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j A j), where
∑















Climatic Change (2013) 120:831–843 835
To express the conjectural variations αi, j, we define a linear reciprocity scale ri, j
such that, in the absence of circumspection, if ∀i, j ri, j = 0, the Nash equilibrium is
obtained, and that, if ∀i, j ri, j = 1, the socially optimal outcome is obtained.
The Nash equilibrium can be found for each player by setting individual marginal
costs equal to individual marginal benefits. So, in Nash equilibrium,
Z ′i(A
n




















Equations 6 and 8 imply that the social optimum can be obtained if and only if
bi(1 + αi) +
∑
j=i
li, jb j = 1 (9)
This condition holds in a pure reciprocity, zero circumspection case if
αi = 1 − bib i , (10)
a condition that can be satisfied if αi, j = b jb i . Accordingly, we define ri, j such that
αi, j = ri, j b jb i . Equation 9 also holds in a zero reciprocity, pure circumspection case if
∑
j=i
li, jb j = 1 − bi, (11)
a condition which can be satisfied if li, j = 1.


















This is the central equation of the model.
2.2 Numerical implementation
The nonlinear set of n equations defined by Eq. 12 can be solved numerically
for n players. We consider a 14-player case. Reference net present value (NPV)
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 21st century cumulative emissions are based
upon scenario SSP 9 of Eom et al. (2012) (Table S1). SSP 9 is an experimental
shared socioeconomic pathway for the 21st century, developed with the Global
Change Assessment Model (GCAM). It has moderate population growth (a global
population of ∼9 billion in 2100) and GDP growth (a productivity growth rate of
1.5 %/year in the United States), and it is similar to the “middle-of-the-road” final
shared socioeconomic pathway SSP 2 (O’Neill et al. 2012).
836 Climatic Change (2013) 120:831–843
2.2.1 Marginal abatement costs
Marginal abatement costs Z ′i(Ai) are assumed to be linear in abatement, derived
from total abatement costs Zi(Ai) that, as a fraction of player GDP, are a quadratic
















where Yi is the reference (net present value, at a 3 % social discount rate) GDP
of player i, and Ei is its reference cumulative emissions. So that socially optimal
cumulative abatement levels are similar to those projected by matDICE (Kopp et al.
2012), an integrated assessment model similar to the DICE model of Nordhaus
(2008), z is set equal to 0.06.
2.2.2 Marginal benef its of abatement
The share of benefits assigned to any given player is proportional to its share of global
NPV GDP, bi = Yi/∑ j Y j. Discount rates are assumed to be constant at 3 % per
year. The global marginal benefit function φ is either constant (φ = φ0) or linearly
declining in cumulative total abatement (φ = φ0 − m ∑ j A j), with φ0 and m defined
such that global marginal benefits resemble those estimated with matDICE.
In matDICE, as in DICE, total damages as a function of temperature are given by
D(T)/Y = 1 − 1
1 + αTβ ≈ αT
β (15)
where Y is global GDP. We match the constant marginal benefit function in
the analytical model with the standard DICE quadratic damage function (β = 2,
α = 0.28 %/◦C2), and the linearly declining marginal benefit function with a cubic
damage function (β = 3, α = 0.19 %/◦C3 ) (Fig. 1a–c). The two damage functions are
calibrated to yield the same damages at 1.5◦ warming, an anchor point chosen so that
the globally optimal trajectory with the cubic damage function keeps temperatures
below the Cancun Accord target of 2◦C. (Non-CO2 climate forcers are neglected for
this calculation.) In benefit-cost optimization mode, the quadratic damage function
leads to optimal peak warming in 2135 at 2.7◦C and optimal CO2 concentration
peaking in 2115 at 560 ppm. Using the cubic damage function, optimal warming
peaks in 2095 at 2.0◦C and optimal CO2 concentration peaks in 2075 at 477 ppm.
2.2.3 Solution algorithm
With the above parameter choices, the n equations represented by Eq. 12 are
fully specified except for the exogenous reciprocity and circumspection parameters.
However, if these equations are solved for arbitrary values of ri, j (i.e., if each player
is independently optimizing based on their own circumspection and expectations
about reciprocity) the solution will not in general be consistent with the specified
conjectural variations. Since the game represents a century of abatement choices,
this inconsistency is not desirable; presumably, over the century, players will calibrate
their expectations about reciprocity against other players’ actions.
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Fig. 1 a Two marginal global benefit curves φ(A) (linearly declining: blue; constant: red) and
the global marginal abatement cost curve (green) used to implement the simple analytical model.
Stars/diamonds indicate the global abatement level and global marginal benefits at the social op-
tima/Nash equilibria. b matDICE damage functions (damages as % of global GDP) with β = 2 (red)
and β = 3 (blue). c Social cost of carbon curves for 2015 at a 3 % discount rate from matDICE for
the two damage functions (red, blue) and the global marginal abatement cost curve (MAC) (green)
for 2015/2035/2055 (dash-dotted/solid/dashed), under abatement pathways with linearly increasing
abatement fractions (see the description of Class B pathways in the Supplementary Material). Stars
indicate the 2015 SCC under globally optimized abatement pathways. d As in (c), but with a constant
climate response to emissions of 2◦C/Tt C. Note change in scale
To avoid this inconsistency, we assume that player 1 is dominant, making its own
assumptions about reciprocity and circumspection, and that other players respond to
player 1 in a way consistent with player 1’s conjectural variations. For simplicity, we
also assume that player 1 exhibits equal circumspection toward all other players and
that it expects identical reciprocity from all other players. Accordingly, we set r1, j = r
and l1, j = l for all j = 1.
We also set ri, j + li, j = r for all i = 1, j. The interpretation of this assumption is
that r reflects a belief about the general degree of cooperativeness in the world, and
that, among players other than player 1, this cooperativeness could be a result of
either reciprocity or circumspection. This closure allows α j,i = 1/αi, j (equivalently,
r j,i = b
2
j
b 2i ri, j
); in other words, it allows for consistent conjectural variations.
Under these assumptions, (r, l) = (0, 0) leads to the Nash equilibrium and (r, l) =
(1, 0) achieves the social optimum. For this analysis, we identify player 1 with the
United States.
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3 Results and discussion
3.1 Optimal carbon prices
In general, the use of a global SCC in domestic BCA can be motivated by assump-
tions of full reciprocity, complete circumspection, or an intermediate combination of
the two. However, the global SCC may vary with decreasing climate change and thus
with increasing global abatement. As a consequence, the global SCC calculated off
of a BAU scenario (henceforth, global BAU SCC) may differ from the global SCC
calculated off of the globally optimal policy scenario (henceforth, global policy SCC).
The use of a global BAU SCC cannot generally be justified based on reciprocity; if
there were reciprocity, the world would no longer be following a BAU scenario.
Except in the special case where marginal benefits do not vary with abatement
(meaning that the global BAU SCC equals the global policy SCC), the choice of
the global BAU SCC makes sense only on grounds of complete circumspection.
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Fig. 2 a, b Illustrative U.S. (black dashed) and global (black solid) SCC curves and the optimal
U.S. carbon price (green). On the black solid curves, the global BAU SCC occurs at r = 0 and the
global policy SCC at r = 1. c, d Fraction of the gap between the domestic SCC without reciprocity
or circumspection (i.e., the Nash equilibrium carbon price) and the global policy SCC (the socially
optimal carbon price) that is closed under different levels of reciprocity and circumspection. a, c
shows values for marginal benefits of abatement that are constant in abatement, while b, d shows the
same for marginal benefits that are linearly declining in abatement
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In the absence of circumspection, the domestically optimal carbon price will equal
the global policy SCC when full reciprocity is assumed. This can be seen analytically
in Eq. 12. If marginal benefits are roughly constant with abatement, the domestically
optimal carbon price will approach the single global SCC linearly with increasing
reciprocity (Fig. 2a). On the other hand, if marginal benefits decrease with abate-
ment, the domestically optimal carbon price will approach the global policy SCC
concavely with increasing reciprocity (Fig. 2b); half the reciprocity needed to achieve
the globally optimal level of abatement will close the gap between the domestically
optimal price and the global policy SCC by more than half. Intuitively, this can be
understood by noting that, with marginal benefits declining in domestic abatement,
increasing reciprocity not only raises the domestically optimal price by scaling the





is declining while its multiplier
∑
j=i ri, jb j is increasing.
The gap between the global policy SCC and the optimal domestic carbon price
reflects the level of circumspection required to justify using the global policy SCC.
If φ is constant, then, as observed in Fig. 2c, Eq. 12 is linear in reciprocity and
circumspection, with reciprocity and circumspection perfectly substitutable for one





will decline more in response to increasing reciprocity than in response
to increasing circumspection, as the former directly affects all global emissions, while
the latter affects only a single player’s emissions. The symmetry between reciprocity
and circumspection is accordingly broken; while, in the absence of circumspection,
complete reciprocity is still required to close the gap between the global policy SCC
and the optimal domestic carbon price, incomplete circumspection can accomplish
the same task in the absence of reciprocity In the example in Fig. 2d, for example,
the global policy SCC can be justified with about 50 % circumspection assuming no
reciprocity, or with about 25 % circumspection assuming 50 % reciprocity.
3.2 Are marginal benefits decreasing?
Are the marginal benefits of climate change mitigation decreasing with abatement?
This question can be considered by decomposing marginal damages with respect to
cumulative emissions ∂ D
∂ E , which are equivalent to the marginal benefits of abate-
ment, into the product of the partial derivatives of damages D with respect to
temperature T, temperature with respect to radiative forcing F, forcing with respect
to atmospheric CO2 concentrations C, and atmospheric CO2 concentrations with












Temperature is approximately linear in forcing (Hansen et al. 1981), and (neglecting
non-CO2 forcers) forcing is logarithmic in CO2 concentration (Ramaswamy et al.
2001). DICE and similar integrated assessment models employ estimates of damages
(as a fraction of GDP) that are approximate power functions of temperature (e.g.,
Eq. 15). Assuming CO2 concentration varies linearly with E—an assumption that
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holds in the long-term if, as in most integrated assessment models, climate-carbon









∝ [log(1 + f E/C0)]
β−1
1 + f E/C0 , (17)
where β is the exponent of temperature in the damage function, f is the frac-
tion of emissions that accumulate in the atmosphere and C0 is the pre-industrial
concentration of atmospheric CO2. If f ≈ 0.5, then for β = 2, as in the standard
configuration of DICE, this expression has a broad plateau centered around 7,000 Gt
CO2 cumulative emissions, a range close to BAU emissions through the 21st century
under many scenarios. Consequently, marginal damages will be roughly constant in
cumulative emissions, and marginal benefits will be roughly constant in cumulative
abatement.
Some authors, however, regard the quadratic relationship between temperature
and damages as conservative, and suggest that a risk-based analysis of climate
change should consider the plausibility of higher-order exponents (e.g., Hope 2006;
Ackerman et al. 2010; Kopp et al. 2012; Weitzman 2012). Higher-order polynomials
give rise to marginal damage curves that plateau at cumulative emissions in excess of
BAU and are consequently monotonically increasing in cumulative emissions for all
relevant emissions levels (marginal benefit curves that are monotonically decreasing
in abatement for all relevant abatement levels).
Even if a quadratic function accurately represents the relationship between
climate damages and temperatures, marginal benefits that decline with abatement
can arise for another reason: the CO2 buffering capacity of the ocean declines as
the atmospheric and marine inorganic carbon inventory increases (Goodwin et al.
2009). Other climate-carbon cycle feedbacks may also lead the airborne fraction of
emissions to increase (Matthews et al. 2009; Le Quéré et al. 2009). Depending on
the strength of these feedbacks, temperature may be better approximated as a linear
rather than a logarithmic function of cumulative emissions (Matthews et al. 2009;
Goodwin et al. 2009). In this case
∂ D
∂ E
∝ Tβ−1 ∝ Eβ−1, (18)
which is increasing in emissions and yields marginal benefits that decline in abate-
ment for any β > 1.
To compare the relationships in Eqs. 17 and 18 with those generated by a numer-
ical model that incorporates temporal dynamics, we used matDICE to calculate the
SCC as a function of cumulative emissions for two different damage functions with
different values of β (Fig. 1b) and two different relationships between emissions and
temperature—either the standard DICE climate and carbon cycle model (Fig. 1c), or
a constant climate response to emissions of 2◦C/Tt cumulative C emissions (0.55◦C/Tt
CO2) (Fig. 1d). The results are reasonably consistent with the analytical expressions,
though the best-fit effective values of β differ somewhat from the value of β that
appears in the damage function. This is a result of the temporal distribution of
damages; alternative pathways to the same cumulative emissions give rise to SCC
curves with similar end points but exhibiting different degrees of curvature (see
Supplementary Material).
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3.3 A comment on discounting and uncertainty
This analysis is focused on conceptual relationships, not numerical values. We
employ deterministic climate and economic projections and a constant 3 % social
discount rate, but alternative assumptions about uncertainty, time discounting, risk
aversion and equity weighting should not qualitatively affect the conceptual conclu-
sions. Equations 16–18 provide insight into how changes in these parameters would
affect results. Incorporating risk aversion in combination with increased uncertainty
(e.g., Kopp et al. 2012; Anthoff et al. 2009) places greater weight on bad states of
the world and effectively increases β. Increasing time discounting reduces the period
of concern and the temperature of concern, effectively reducing T. It also reduces
the NPV GDP, and therefore the constant of proportionality in the marginal damage
expressions. The effect of equity weights (e.g., Anthoff and Tol 2010) is ambiguous
and will depend upon other factors such as risk aversion.
4 Policy implications
At present, the U.S. government employs a global SCC for domestic regulatory
analyses. More specifically, it employs SCC estimates based predominantly on
scenarios in which there is no significant global mitigation. Four of the five scenarios
assume no global mitigation, the fifth assumes a 550 ppm CO2 stabilization scenario,
and all five are considered equally probable (Interagency Working Group on the
Social Cost of Carbon 2010). The four BAU scenarios imply zero reciprocity—
otherwise, the world would move from BAU to some higher abatement state—while
the fifth suggests but does not require non-zero reciprocity. The use of a global BAU
SCC can be motivated on grounds of reciprocity only when marginal benefits are
approximately constant in abatement; otherwise it implies a considerable degree of
circumspection. In contrast, the use of the global policy SCC could be supported on
grounds of either reciprocity or circumspection.
If the marginal benefits of abatement are constant, then circumspection and
reciprocity are perfect substitutes, so that either full circumspection, full reciprocity,
or a linear mixture can support the use of the single global SCC. If marginal benefits
are declining, however, increasing reciprocity leads the optimal domestic carbon
price to approach the global policy SCC concavely, meaning that even imperfect
reciprocity can come close to supporting the global policy SCC. Moreover, in the
declining marginal benefits case, partial circumspection can support the use of
the global policy SCC without reciprocity, and even less circumspection is needed
when some reciprocity is assumed. The possibility of greater-than-quadratic climate
damages and the expectation of weakening carbon sinks can both give rise to
declining marginal damages, as shown both analytically and numerically.
While motivated by the desire to refine SCC estimates used in regulatory analy-
sis, the circumspection/reciprocity framework highlights choices any government—
national, sub-national, or supra-national—must make when utilizing a carbon price.
Aside from the central physical and economic projections that go into constructing
SCC estimates, the optimal carbon price trajectory also depends critically on judg-
ments regarding circumspection and reciprocity. The implications of these judgments
depend upon the nature of both climate damages and the global carbon cycle.
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